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a/k/a Obed Radiowala, a/k/a Obaid Radiowalla, 
                                                                Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
      Respondent 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (A093-454-642) 
Immigration Judge:  Virma A. Wright 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 27, 2019  
 
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 We are a nation of immigrants, and immigrant stories.  
And Ubaidullah Abdulrashid Radiowala’s story has the 
makings of a compelling one.  He entered the United States on 
a visitor’s visa in April of 1998, with his wife and two children.  
He testified that he started out supporting a family of four on 
$300 a week, while living in a residence with two other 
families.  His efforts over the course of the next two decades 
were met with relative success:  he developed a lucrative 
 3 
business that enabled him to remain the sole provider for his 
mother in India, his wife and two children who emigrated with 
him, and the two children he has had since, both of whom are 
United States citizens.  For this group, he bears the entire 
financial burden on everything:  from all household expenses 
to the rent and college tuition of three of his children.  His 
fourth child is currently in high school.   
 He was arrested during a traffic stop in 2017, and 
subsequently charged as removable.  The Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”) presiding over his case denied his application for relief, 
determining that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal, 
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under Article III of 
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  The Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“the Board”) affirmed.  Radiowala filed 
this petition for review, primarily asking that we consider his 
relatively non-existent criminal history and his role as the sole 
provider for his family.  However, the principal avenue for 
doing so—cancellation of removal—is a ground on which the 
Board’s decision is largely unreviewable.  None of the other 
avenues fit his case—Radiowala became ineligible for asylum 
over 19 years ago, the proposed social groups of which he is a 
part are not legally cognizable, and substantial evidence 
supports the Board’s determination that he is unlikely to be 
tortured if returned to India.   
 We must therefore dismiss Radiowala’s petition in part, 
and deny it in part.    
I.  
 Radiowala entered the United States over 20 years ago, 
in order to escape the reach of a notable Indian gangster by the 
name of Dawood Ibrahim.  Radiowala was arrested during a 
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vehicle stop in New Jersey, on September 20, 2017.1  Pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), the Department of Homeland 
Security charged him as removable because he was present in 
the United States without having been admitted or paroled.  
Radiowala conceded the charge but applied for cancellation of 
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), asylum under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(A), withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 
                                                 
 1 It bears mention that, in August of 2015, Interpol 
issued a Red Notice for Radiowala’s arrest.  The Notice alleged 
that, in August of the previous year, he conspired with others 
in India to extort a Bollywood movie producer.  The Board did 
not at all premise its determinations on this Notice, however, 
as it was not required to do so.  Indeed, Interpol makes clear 
that it “cannot compel the law enforcement authorities in any 
country to arrest someone who is subject of a Red Notice,” as 
“[e]ach member country decides for itself what legal value to 
give a Red Notice . . .”  Interpol, Red Notices, 
https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Notices/Red-
Notices (last visited July 1, 2019).  To this effect, Congress has 
not seen fit to prescribe that an Interpol Red Notice alone is an 
independent basis for removal.  Nor has it endeavored to make 
it an express consideration for any of the reliefs sought by 
Radiowala.  Relatedly, the Department of Justice’s view is that, 
by itself, a Red Notice is not a sufficient basis for arresting 
someone, for its issuance often falls short of what the Fourth 
Amendment requires.  See Department of Justice, Interpol 
Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.justice.gov/interpol-
washington/frequently-asked-questions#thirteen (last updated 
April 29, 2019).  We thus proceed as the Board did and give no 
weight to the existence and content of the Red Notice in this 
case.   
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1231(b)(3)(A), and protection under the CAT, 8 C.F.R. §§ 
1208.16–18.  In support of his application, he provided 
testimony and documentation to the effect of the following: 
 In India, Radiowala was a rickshaw driver2 who 
doubled as a paid confidential informant for a police officer.  
He was enlisted by an officer by the name of Vijay Salesker, 
and primarily sought information about a gang known as “the 
Arun Gawli Gang.”  A.R. 252.  From 1994 to 1998, Radiowala 
would obtain information by way of various gang members 
who took his rickshaw and would relay this information to 
Salesker.  The content varied, ranging from extortion activities 
to information regarding a potential homicide.  The 
compensation varied accordingly—approximately 2,000 to 
6,000 rupees based on the value of the information Radiowala 
provided. 
 In 1996, Radiowala began serving as the driver for a 
gangster by the name of Hussain Vastra.  He continued his 
informant work in this capacity.  Sometime later, it was 
discovered that Vastra was also an informant, both by 
Radiowala and by a smuggler by the name of Dawood Ibrahim.  
This discovery did not bode well for Radiowala:  he was soon 
discovered to also be an informant and faced death threats from 
those working for Ibrahim, including gang members and police 
officers.  Notably, those individuals “blame[d] him for the 
information that was “pass[ed] on” by Vastra.  A.R. 161–62 
(testifying that “they put everything on me”).  Radiowala 
                                                 
 2 In this context, a rickshaw is a three-wheeled car that 
is operated in a manner similar to a taxi. 
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turned to officer Salesker, who in turn assisted him in obtaining 
a passport under an alias.  
 By way of a visitor visa, Radiowala arrived in the 
United States in April of 1998, along with his wife and two 
children.  They have remained here since.  He initially had to 
support his family on $300 a week while living in a residence 
with two other families.  He went on to own a successful 
wholesale distribution company for beauty products and over-
the-counter drugs.  His tax filings indicate that this company’s 
gross profits range from $120,000 to $225,000 a year.  He also 
had two other children, both of whom are United States 
citizens.  Three of his children are in college and the fourth 
attends high school. 
 Through his business, Radiowala has been the sole 
provider for his entire family.  He lists his wife and all of their 
children as employees and pools together their income from 
the business into an account that pays for all household bills, 
tuitions, and other expenses, such as rent and car payments.  In 
the words of Dr. Mark Silver—the New York state licensed 
clinical social worker who interviewed Radiowala’s family on 
numerous occasions—Radiowala is “the primary caregiver in 
[his] family. . . .  He’s really the main source of financial 
support, and without [this] support, [there is] not only concern 
about basic necessities, rent and so on, but also continuing with 
payments for tuition for college, extracurricular needs, and so 
on.”  A.R. 198–99.  
 Radiowala insisted that this would all come to an end if 
he was removed to India.  He testified that his business would 
come to ruin and, with it, the only source of financial support 
for his family—notably, his two immigrant children who are 
Deferred-Action-for-Childhood-Arrival (“DACA”) recipients 
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would no longer have their tuition and rent paid for, the same 
is true of his college-age-United States-citizen daughter, and 
his high school-age child, who would not be able to receive the 
prescription ear drops that she needs.  In addition, he testified 
that those working for Ibrahim would be able to find and kill 
him. 
 The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found this testimony to 
be credible, but nonetheless denied Radiowala’s plea for relief 
on all scores.  The Board affirmed, ultimately adopting the IJ’s 
reasoning.  Radiowala petitioned this Court to review the 
Board’s decision.  He also asked that we maintain the 
temporary stay of his removal order pending the resolution of 
his petition on the merits.  We denied this request, so he has 
since been removed to India.   
II.  
 We nonetheless have jurisdiction to review the Board’s 
decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Mendoza-Ordonez v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 869 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 2017).  Our review is 
limited to the reasons provided by the Board.  See Orabi v. 
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 539 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 
(1947) and Li v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 400 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 
2005)).  But we may also consider the IJ’s opinion where the 
Board adopted or deferred to the IJ’s reasoning.  Mendoza-
Ordonez, 869 F.3d at 169 (citing Nelson v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
685 F.3d 318, 321 (3d Cir. 2012)).  We review constitutional 
issues and questions of law under a de novo standard and 
regard the Board’s factual determinations as “conclusive 
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude the contrary.”  Id. (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  This “extraordinarily deferential” standard 
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requires that we uphold the Board’s findings so long as they 
are supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence on the record considered as a whole.”  Garcia v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2011), as 
amended (Jan. 13, 2012) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).   
III.  
 The facts of Radiowala’s case render it principally one 
for cancellation of removal.  Yet the Board denied him this 
relief, and its determination is one that we do not have the 
power to review.  The other forms of relief he seeks do not fit 
his circumstance—he became ineligible for asylum over 19 
years ago, the proposed social groups of which he is a part are 
not legally cognizable, and substantial evidence supports the 
Board’s predictive finding that he is unlikely to be tortured if 
returned to India.  We must therefore dismiss his petition as to 
his cancellation of removal claim and deny it in all other 
respects.   
A. Asylum 
 As we alluded, a petitioner in Radiowala’s position 
would typically look to cancellation of removal as the avenue 
for relief.  This is because this avenue takes into account what 
a petitioner has done with her time in the United States.  
Indeed, it requires that a petitioner establish (1) continuous 
physical presence in the United States for the ten years 
preceding the application, (2) good moral character, (3) that 
she has not been convicted of certain criminal offenses, and (4) 
that her removal would cause “exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship to [her] spouse, parent, or child, who is a 
United States citizen or [a noncitizen] lawfully admitted for 
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permanent residence.”  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).  In essence, it 
is an expression that, although you entered our nation without 
our permission (or overstayed your welcome), we will allow 
you to remain if you have behaved and if removing you after 
so much time has passed would result in a particular kind of 
hardship.   
 Unfortunately for Radiowala, however, the IJ and Board 
foreclosed this avenue when they determined that, although he 
met the first three requirements, he could not show that the 
requisite hardship would result from his removal.  In the 
Board’s view, despite what Radiowala has accomplished and 
how much his family currently depends on him, the hardship 
that his qualifying relatives—his two citizen children—would 
suffer if he were to be removed would not be substantially 
beyond what typically results from removal.  A.R. 3; see also 
In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. 56, 69 (BIA 2001) 
(defining “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” as 
harm to qualifying relatives that is “substantially beyond that 
which would ordinarily be expected to result from the alien’s 
deportation”) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828).   
 This decision cannot be reviewed by a court unless the 
issue for review is whether the Board or IJ applied the 
appropriate standard.  See Patel v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 619 F.3d 
230, 233 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We lack jurisdiction to review 
discretionary decisions made pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, 
including ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ 
determinations . . . [except where the issue is] whether the IJ 
used the correct legal standard to reach this determination.”).  
Radiowala has made no argument that the Board used the 
incorrect standard.   
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 We are therefore precluded from reviewing the Board’s 
determination on this issue.   
B. Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and Relief under 
the CAT 
 Radiowalla turns to asylum, withholding of removal, 
and relief under the CAT as alternatives.  But none fit his case. 
1.  
 Radiowala’s asylum3 and withholding claims are both 
premised on the fear that, if returned to India, he would be 
persecuted on account of his membership in two particular 
social groups.  The first is comprised of “former criminal 
informants who testify against criminal gangsters, mafia, 
criminal delinquents, and members of organized crime,” and 
the second consists of “persons targeted precisely for their 
willingness to speak the truth at great risk to themselves.”  A.R.  
                                                 
 3 An asylum petitioner must apply for the relief within 
one year of her entering the United States, regardless of 
whether she was admitted or paroled.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(a)(2)(B).  At the time of his application, it had been nearly 
20 years since Radiowala entered the United States, so the 
Board and IJ concluded that he is not eligible for asylum.  
Radiowala informs this Court that he “is not seeking review of 
the time-barred asylum filing,” Pet’r. Op. Br. n.1, but he 
references the relief in other parts of his brief, id. at 13, 17–23.  
The asylum and withholding analyses are the same in this 
context, so even if we set aside the Board’s untimeliness 
determination—which we do not—Radiowala’s asylum claim 
fails for the reasons that follow.      
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5–6, 59.  Though asylum and withholding are two separate 
forms of relief with different standards of proof, a petitioner 
who bases his or her claim for either on membership in a 
particular social group must, inter alia, establish that the 
particular social group in question is legally cognizable.  
S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 894 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(citing Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993)).  The 
Board adopted the IJ’s ruling that Radiowala is not a member 
of a group that meets this requirement.  There is substantial 
evidence in the record to support this finding.           
 To be legally cognizable, a proposed social group must 
be (1) composed of members who share a common, immutable 
characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially 
distinct within the society in question.  See S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d 
at 540.  A characteristic is immutable if it is one that a person 
cannot change or should not be required to change as a matter 
of conscience to avoid persecution.  Id. at 543.  A group is 
particularized if it is discrete, has definable boundaries—as 
opposed to being overbroad, diffuse, or subjective—and its 
definition provides a benchmark for determining who falls 
within it.  Id. at 547.  And social distinction requires “evidence 
that the society in question recognizes a proposed group as 
distinct.”  Id. at 551.  The latter two—particularity and social 
distinction—differ in that the former speaks to “‘the outer 
limits[] of a group’s boundaries,’” and the latter focuses on 
“‘whether the people of a given society would perceive a 
proposed group as sufficiently separate or distinct.’”  Id. at 548 
(citations omitted).  
 As to Radiowala’s first proposed group, we have 
previously held that a group consisting of “witnesses who have 
the ‘shared past experience’ of assisting law enforcement 
against violent gangs that threaten communities in Guatemala” 
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is legally cognizable.  Garcia, 665 F.3d at 504.  We reasoned 
that the shared experience of having testified against violent 
gang members is a common, immutable characteristic that the 
group members could not change “because it is based on past 
conduct that cannot be undone,” and, “[t]o the extent that 
members . . . [could] recant their testimony, they should not be 
required to do so.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
addition, the group is particularized:  a group essentially 
comprised of those who have testified in court has definable 
boundaries and is equipped with a benchmark for determining 
who falls within it.  Equally, the act of testifying also lends 
itself to societal recognition—generally, speaking in open 
court means that all are readily aware of the group and its 
members, not just those that are being provided information or 
potential persecutors who are forever seeking to ferret out 
informants.  See id. n.5 (distinguishing this group from 
confidential informants on the basis that their aid to the law 
enforcement is public, and their identity is readily known to 
their persecutors).   
 The Board concluded that such a group is legally 
cognizable.  A.R. 5 (“Witnesses who have the shared past 
experience of testifying in prosecution against violent gangs 
can constitute a particular social group.”) (citing Garcia, 665 
F.3d at 504).  But the record is devoid of evidence that 
Radiowala actually testified against anyone.  As a result, the 
Board and IJ concluded that Radiowala had not demonstrated 
that he was a part of this group.   
 We agree—all Radiowala has put forth is that he was a 
paid confidential informant that relayed information to one 
particular officer.  To this effect, the group of which he is a 
member is simply one of paid confidential informants in India.  
It indeed has some similarities to the one he proposed.  The 
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characteristic of having provided information to aid law 
enforcement is immutable in the sense that it also derives from 
past conduct and thus cannot be changed, nor should one be 
required to change it.  There might also be a basis for 
concluding that the group is sufficiently particularized:  the 
record is unclear, but regularly receiving payment from 
government officials theoretically offers a basis for identifying 
group members and a definable boundary.   
 The potential for similarity stops there, however, as 
nothing in the record indicates that the community in India 
perceives paid confidential informants as a distinct group in 
society.  See S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 548.   Radiowala’s sole 
argument to the contrary is that “‘society’s perception’ like that 
of Officer Salesker is what counts.”  Pet’r. Op. Br. 20.  
However, though relevant, by itself, the perception of the 
particular officer to whom an informant provides information 
does not demonstrate that society recognizes a group 
comprised of those who do so.  Rather, the inquiry is “whether 
those with a common immutable characteristic are set apart, or 
distinct, from other persons within the society in some 
significant way.”  Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 
238 (BIA 2014) (emphasis added).  By definition, paid 
confidential informants provide aid to law enforcement 
privately.  So, without more, a group comprised of them is 
indistinguishable from those in the general public whom a 
criminal gang might otherwise suspect as having informed on 
it.  See In Re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960–61 (BIA 2006).  
That, like Radiowala, the group members’ informant status 
may have, by a means unlike and other than testifying publicly, 
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been disclosed to alleged persecutors does not change the 
analysis.4 
 We conclude that this is not a legally cognizable group.  
In reaching this conclusion, the distinction we draw between 
this group and one comprised of informants who have publicly 
testified is consistent with that drawn by the Board and every 
other circuit to have spoken on the issue.  See, e.g., id. at 960 
(explaining that a proposed group of confidential informants 
lacks social visibility because “the very nature of the conduct 
                                                 
 4 Indeed, the persecution faced by informants whose 
status is assuredly disclosed is markedly different from those 
who, like many in the public, are merely perceived as, or 
suspected of, being informants.  For example, in Garcia, the 
persecution one of the petitioners faced was distinctly severe 
when the persecutors were assured that she was an informant 
than when they merely suspected it.  Compare 665 F.3d. at 500 
(receiving a telephone call indicating “concern[] that [she] 
would report . . . to the police”) with id. at 500–01 (receiving 
threatening phone calls despite “around the clock” protection 
“by armed security teams” and being “moved from hotel to 
hotel as many as twelve times in three months,” one of which 
was from “an unknown individual who said that [the petitioner] 
was being watched during her first court appearance and that if 
she testified, she and [her sister] would be killed.  The caller 
also mentioned that [an affiliate] knew where her mother and 
[her sister] were living in the United States”).  Thus, although 
Garcia’s persecutors suspected her of being an informant long 
before she testified in open court, we relied on her act of 
publicly testifying in distinguishing her case from those 
involving proposed social groups of confidential informants.  
See id. at 504 n.5.  
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at issue is such that it is generally out of the public view”);5 
Ngugi v. Lynch, 826 F.3d 1132, 1138 (8th Cir. 2016) (rejecting 
a proposed social group of “witnesses to the criminal 
activities” of a group in part because there was no evidence that 
the petitioner “ever served as a witness against the [group] in 
any public proceedings”); Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 
F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing prior cases in 
which a gang-related proposed social group was rejected from 
those involving “the very specific situation of testifying against 
gang members in court” as “for those who have publicly 
testified against gang members, their ‘social [distinction] is 
apparent’”); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125 
(4th Cir. 2011) (concluding that a group comprised of family 
members of those who testified against MS–13 was a 
cognizable particular social group); Castillo-Arias v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S.., 446 F.3d 1190, 1197–98 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(rejecting a proposed group of noncriminal informants working 
against the Cali drug cartel in part because the very nature of 
their activity prevents them from being recognized by society 
at large). 
 Radiowala’s second proposed group is a non-starter.  A 
group of persons “targeted” for their “willingness to speak the 
truth at great risk to themselves” is defined by the harm or 
potential harm posed to its members.  In setting forth the 
particularity and social distinction requirements, the Board 
                                                 
 5 As the Board clarified in Matter of M-E-V-G-, the 
social distinction requirement does not mean “[l]iteral or 
‘ocular’ visibility”; rather, the focus is “on the extent to which 
the group is understood to exist as a recognized component of 
the society in question.”  26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 238–39 (BIA 
2014). 
 16 
reaffirmed its determination that “persecutory conduct alone 
cannot define a group.”  S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 549 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. 208, 215 (BIA 2014)).  We accepted the Board’s 
chosen course in S.E.R.L.  As a consequence, a group so 
defined is not legally cognizable.     
2.  
 Radiowala’s petition for relief under the CAT also fails.  
To warrant CAT relief, a petitioner “bears the burden of 
establishing ‘that it is more likely than not that . . . she would 
be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’”  
Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174–75 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)).  Torture is defined as the 
intentional infliction of severe pain and suffering, whether 
physical or mental, for illicit purposes, and “by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.”  Id.  
There is no subjective component to the above assessment.  Id.  
A petitioner is required to meet her burden by objective 
evidence alone.  Id.  
 The IJ found that Radiowala did not meet his burden.  It 
found no evidence that anyone has been searching for 
Radiowala since he left India over 20 years ago, and that his 
pursuer (Dawood Ibrahim) is presently hiding in Pakistan.  In 
the IJ’s view, the fact that the officer to whom Radiowala 
provided information was killed ten years after he left was not 
enough to suggest that an informant of 20 years ago would be 
pursued, let alone tortured.  This is because the officer 
remained high profile, and actively engaged in a national 
operation against Ibrahim, which is not true of Radiowala.  The 
Board affirmed. 
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 We review this decision for abuse of discretion, which 
requires reversal only if the decision was “arbitrary, irrational, 
or contrary to law.”  Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 174 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, we are not persuaded 
that Ibrahim’s absence from India means that those he pursues 
are safe.  Officer Salesker’s death counsels otherwise, to the 
extent that it was at the hands of associates of Ibrahim.  
However, at the time of the Board’s decision, Radiowala had 
been absent from India for nearly 20 years and there was no 
evidence that harm or threats came to anyone—i.e., his mother 
who remained in India—on his behalf.  To this effect, the 
Board and IJ are correct to point out that Officer Salesker 
independently continued his pursuit of Ibrahim.  As a result, 
we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion to conclude 
that Radiowala’s fear of torture was “too speculative to merit 
protection.”  A.R. 62.  
 Radiowala’s sole argument to the contrary is that “[h]e 
testified that the police officials in India worked with the 
criminal gangster[s] and he was afraid of the police as well.”  
Pet’r. Op. Br. 22.  Even if we accepted that this testimony 
demonstrates that what Radiowala could possibly face has one 
of the five elements of torture—an act by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official—it 
does nothing to undercut the IJ’s finding that he is unlikely to 
be pursued in the first instance.   
IV. 
 For all of these reasons, we will dismiss the petition for 
review as to Radiowala’s cancellation of removal claim and 
deny it in all other respects.  
